


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


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**A Survey of the Command  
Information Function in U.S. Army  
Maneuver Battalions  
During the Gulf War**



**A Thesis  
Presented To  
the Faculty of the W. Page Pitt  
School of Journalism and Mass Communications**



**In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts in Journalism**

**By  
Captain John E. Suttle  
United States Army**

**November 1993**

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as meeting the research requirement for the degree, Master of Arts in  
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## **Acknowledgment**

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# Chapter I

## INTRODUCTION

### Background and Statement of Problem

*"From the Revolutionary War through Operation Desert Storm, the Army has found that informed soldiers fight better and are more likely to survive than soldiers who don't understand why they fight" (Public Affairs Operations 2-4).*

Command information, the U.S. Army's internal communications function, is designed to keep soldiers informed and answer their questions about events concerning them. Today's soldiers grew up having access to CNN and other instant information media and expect access to information even in a combat environment.

United States citizens generally are taught a Judeo-Christian value system that places great importance on human life. One is taught to love thy neighbor and that killing another human being is morally wrong (Christians, Rotzoll, and Fackler 19). When a soldier is asked to kill the enemy, the result is internal conflict between the requested action and his/her beliefs. This phenomenon is referred to as cognitive dissonance (Rubin and McNeil 240).

Cognitive dissonance may be reduced if soldiers believe the American public support their efforts on the battlefield. Well-informed soldiers will fight harder if they believe they have a mandate from the people. Thus, command information is a force multiplier because it increases the effectiveness of individual soldiers by reducing cognitive dissonance.

Cognitive dissonance may be reduced further if leaders speak with one clear

voice when answering soldiers' questions. The ability for commanders to articulate an official answer consistent with superior, subordinate, and adjacent commanders is essential in reassuring soldiers there really is a master plan (Public Affairs Operations 2-7).

It is the commander's responsibility to keep soldiers informed, hence the concept of command information is well named. The Army's professional education system should, therefore, instill the importance of command information in commanders.

The Army's public affairs officers must assist commanders by providing them with adequate command information products such as newspapers and news broadcasts that can actually reach soldiers in a combat zone.

Moreso than in previous conflicts, soldiers in the Gulf War received information from sources outside command information channels. These included satellite-linked telephone calls home, BBC shortwave radio news, and the CNN soundtrack over Armed Forces Radio (Gibbs 36).

These outside information sources generated questions from soldiers. Because official command information products such as newspapers often could not keep pace with outside information sources to assist commanders in answering soldiers' questions, information lag resulted.

If commanders are to keep soldiers informed, they must: (1) speak with one clear voice; (2) be sufficiently trained; (3) have adequate command information products; and (4) reduce information lag. These requirements may be thought of as the four critical aspects of command information.

Commanders whose soldiers were in direct contact with the enemy, the maneu-

ver commanders, faced the greatest challenge in keeping soldiers informed because they were at the end of the information pipeline.

Therefore the question: During the Gulf War, were maneuver commanders able to provide soldiers with adequate command information?

## **Purpose**

Although "Command information is the most important public affairs function on the battlefield" (Public Affairs Operations 1-2), it has not received the same attention as its counterpart, public information. The overwhelming majority of scholarly research concerns how the military deals with and relates to mass media.

The purpose of this research was to survey Gulf War maneuver battalion commanders and assess their opinions regarding capabilities in providing command information to soldiers in a combat environment.

## **Significance of the Study**

The aspect of command information during the Gulf War has gone relatively unexplored. On March 21, 1993, the researcher conducted an interview at Fort Harrison, Indiana, with Chief of U.S. Army Public Affairs Proponent Activity, Major Linda Morrison. Major Morrison pointed out that while some data regarding command information in the Gulf War have been collected, there had been no quantitative analysis. She underscored the significance of research in this area by pointing out that command information is the most important public affairs function on the battlefield.

Collecting data from maneuver battalion commanders was appropriate because front-line soldiers have the greatest need for command information (Public Affairs

Operations 2-9). Ironically, these very soldiers are often the last to receive command information because they are at the end of the information pipeline.

### **Research Questions**

The researcher posed four questions, one for each critical aspect of command information.

1. Did Information lag negatively affect the ability of maneuver battalion commanders to provide soldiers with adequate command information?
2. Did maneuver battalion commanders think they spoke with one clear voice when they provided soldiers with command information?
3. Were command information products and resources available to maneuver battalion commanders adequate?
4. Did maneuver battalion commanders receive adequate training regarding command information during their professional military education?

### **Assumptions**

The two assumptions made in this study concern the maneuver battalion commanders themselves. First, it is assumed maneuver battalion commanders were in command of their units for the entire duration of the Gulf War. Second, one presumes the memory recall ability of maneuver battalion commanders is sufficient to answer survey questions regarding events that occurred during the Gulf War.

## **Limitations**

There are three limitations to this research. First, soldiers who make direct contact with the enemy, those in maneuver units, represent only a fraction of troops deployed in a combat theater. Difficulties regarding command information may differ in combat support and combat service support units.

Second, a complete assessment of command information effectiveness may be determined only if the opinions of soldiers are considered. This research is limited in scope to the opinions of maneuver battalion commanders.

Third, the target population's propensity for changing duty stations during summer months could reduce survey return rate, thereby limiting generalizeability of findings.

# **Chapter II**

## **REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

### **U.S. Army Public Affairs Doctrine**

Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, is the U.S. Army's capstone document outlining public affairs operations. The manual explains the three aspects of public affairs: command information, public information, and community relations.

Command information is regarded by the U.S. Army as the most important public affairs aspect on the battlefield. The command information function is the responsibility of unit commanders, and public affairs officers assist them by providing information.

Informed soldiers fight harder when fortified by the knowledge the public supports their efforts (Public Affairs Operations 2-4). Command information is referred to as a force multiplier because it enhances the combat effectiveness of individual soldiers by keeping them informed of public support, thereby reducing cognitive dissonance.

Front-line soldiers facing the enemy have the greatest need for command information, but because of their isolation, they are often the last to receive command information products.

The printed newspaper/newsletter is the command information vehicle of choice on the battlefield. Its ease of production, durability, and capability for multiple readers per copy make it particularly well suited for the front lines. "Well

done command information products, no matter how humble in appearance, do much to dispel rumors and ease fears" (Public Affairs Operations 2-7).

The notion of commanders speaking with one clear voice is essential to field commanders because *"conflicts between what the media reports [sic] and what the soldier or his family hears through official channels cause uncertainty for the soldier and his family, and trouble for his command"* (Public Affairs Operations 2-14).

It is imperative that both positive and negative news reach soldiers in the field. Only by providing both the good and the bad will commanders achieve the balance required to assure soldiers of the credibility of command information (Public Affairs Operations 2-14).

### **Motivational Theory**

Frederick Herzberg's Job Satisfaction Theory may be used to show how command information affects the behavior of the individual soldier. Herzberg's research suggested two types of motivational factors, satisfiers and dissatisfiers. Factors such as achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement and personal growth/development are referred to as satisfiers (motivators) and build levels of motivation resulting in increased job performance (Herzberg 73).

Requisite to these satisfiers having a significant effect on performance is meeting what Herzberg refers to as dissatisfiers or hygiene needs. These include salary, working conditions, quality of supervision and quality of interpersonal relationships with co-workers. These base needs must be met to bring employees to a level of no dissatisfaction that will allow subsequent motivators to be effective



(Szilagi and Wallace 102).

Command information provides for soldiers' basic need for information and gives them a feeling of security. Command information reduces the level of dissatisfaction within the command. Therefore, command information is a hygiene factor.

Herzberg said that hygiene factors describe an employee's relationship, "... to the context or environment in which he does his job" (74). It follows that because soldiers experience frequent changes in work environment, especially during combat, that hygiene factors, such as command information, must be addressed by commanders to reduce levels of dissatisfaction in the ranks.

Additionally, Herzberg said satisfaction with company policy is a hygiene factor, thereby stressing the importance of an organization speaking to its employees with one clear voice (120).

### **Baron von Steuben and Beyond.**

As Inspector General to the American Army during the Revolutionary War, Baron Frederick Wilhelm von Steuben made the following observation: *"The genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians, or French. You say to your soldier, 'do this,' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say, 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and he does it"* (Doyle 12).

Contemporary U.S. Army war fighting doctrine not only recognizes this need to know why--it counts on it. Organizational design of combat units has become increasingly flat with more, smaller, combat units filled with intelligent volunteers.

Because soldiers in these units are well informed, these units are expected to act on their own initiative and continue the mission if cut off from parent units.

Napoleon's adage that there is a field marshal's baton in the rucksack of every private has never been so valid as in today's Army.

In the 1960s, the U.S. Military History Institute surveyed approximately 8,000 survivors of military campaigns in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Boxer Rebellion to determine how they viewed their participation in these wars and their thoughts on press coverage.

Between recollections of slaying the enemy and consorting with native women, the veterans, who were at least 80 years old, made some observations regarding the lack of command information in these campaigns. *"We only knew what people sent us from home," said one. . . More than anything the veterans recalled the dearth of newspapers or magazines and the long time it took to get any mail from home"* (Eberhard 706).

These veterans were concerned with public opinion back home and how the media portrayed their actions in wars that often were not in the forefront of the national media agenda.

### **The Last Appraisal of the Army's Command Information System**

The last definitive appraisal of the command information system was conducted in 1963 by Captain Robert L. Gwaltney. He collected data primarily by writing letters that solicited opinion from U.S. Army officers regarding command information in the early 1960s.

Gwaltney found the following regarding commanders and command information:

1. Commanders thought they did not have adequate control of command information functions.
2. Commanders did not receive adequate training in command information through their professional education.
3. Commanders thought they did not have time to pursue an effective command information program.
4. Commanders feared answering soldiers' questions regarding command information in an open forum because they thought they would lose control of the situation (Gwaltney 43-44).

While Gwaltney's study provides valuable insight into problems with the command information system, it does not view the issue in the context of a combat environment and lacks quantitative conclusions. Additionally, the study makes an interesting reference to a captured North Korean communique that attributed successful brainwashing efforts on American soldiers to their being poorly informed (Gwaltney 9).

### **The Fort Apache Experience**

As an Army officer associated with public affairs and the media for more than 20 years, LTC James Fetig chronicled problems between the military and the media during the Gulf War. In his paper, "Inside Fort Apache," Fetig elaborated on one particular case involving media relations problems resulting from New York Times reporter James LeMoyne's visit to the 2nd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. In

describing problems with the working relationship between LeMoyné and the unit, Fetig made the following observation regarding command information:

*The troops were starved for information. After moving deep into the desert, news of current events evaporated. The BBC was sporadically available over shortwave, but U.S. armed forces radio was mute. Newspapers, including the division's own, which could not substitute for the genuine article, were practically nonexistent and several days late when they arrived . . . The lack of information caused many rumors to develop about the enemy, politics, and the unit's status (Fetig 39).*

Fetig claims public affairs officers in the Gulf War were ill equipped, improperly trained, and unable to conduct effective internal and external communications programs (74). He contends the army as an institution has failed to recognize the relationship between public affairs functions and combat operations (Fetig 76) and that command information shortcomings played a direct role in causing problems between the media and tactical commanders (Fetig 75).

### **The Center For Army Lessons Learned**

Fort Leavenworth's Center for Army Lessons Learned published a newsletter in December, 1992, that provided insight into the command information function during the Gulf War. The center conducted no quantitative research, but highlighted several trends found in after action reports:

1. Soldiers in the Gulf War were "plugged-in." They were intelligent, sophisticated products of the Information Age and the best command information programs recognized this.
2. Printed newspapers and newsletters were highly effective in keeping soldiers informed. Simple products printed at lower levels were better received than

more professional-looking products done at higher levels and were more likely to reach forward units.

3. Many command information products failed to achieve maximum potential because they were often delayed or lost in the distribution process.

4. Soldiers had access to civilian news through portable radios and letters from home. Good command information programs took advantage of civilian news sources and augmented them with local news to answer questions, quell rumors, build morale, and maintain confidence in leadership.

5. Commanders needed to interpret what national and international news meant to soldiers.

6. Command information products should have been treated as official, high-priority correspondence and the distribution process closely monitored.

# **Chapter III**

## **Design of Study**

### **Sources of Data**

The population for this study consisted of the 62 U.S. Army officers, who were still on active duty when the research was conducted, and who commanded a maneuver battalion during the Gulf War.

The commanders' names were provided by the public affairs officers of the six divisions that participated in the Gulf War that were active at the time this research was conducted (First Cavalry, 101st Air Assault, 82nd Airborne, 24th Infantry, First Infantry, and the First Armored).

The commanders' names were forwarded to the U.S. Army Personnel Center where those officers still on active duty were identified to make a comprehensive list of the population for this study. Mailing addresses for these 62 officers were provided by branch managers at the U.S. Army Personnel Center.

### **Research Instrument**

The instrument for collecting data was a questionnaire mailed directly to each member of the population. The instrument consisted of 29 questions arranged in three sections (see Appendix A).

Section one collected demographic information with seven completion and multiple-choice questions.

Section two was configured along a five-point Likert scale and was specifically designed to collect data regarding each of the four research questions. The ques-

tions are all positively worded, with respondents indicating their level of agreement on the Likert scale shown below.

<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>

Questions 8-10 were concerned with information lag, 11-15 were tied to the one clear voice concept, and 16-20 dealt with command information product and resource adequacy. Questions 21-25 looked at the amount of command information training maneuver battalion commanders received in their professional military education.

Section three of the questionnaire, which was optional for respondents, consisted of four open-ended questions, each one relating to a research question.

The instrument was tested for readability using the Flesch-Kincaid readability test and Gunning's Fog Index. The Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease Score was 75, indicating an average reading level of 6-10th grade and Gunning's Fog Index was seven, indicating normal readability.

The instrument was pretested by five U.S. Army public affairs captains pursuing master's degrees in journalism. One question was found to be negatively worded and contrary to the overall positive nature of the instrument and was reworded positively. Minor changes in wording were recommended and were included in the final questionnaire.

### **Treatment of Data**

Data were analyzed using Statistical Analysis Software. An overall response correlation check to examine relationships between questions and test for data entry errors preceded statistical tests for significance and correlation.

Frequency counts and percentage distributions were used to compile, examine, and descriptively illustrate Likert scale responses as they were linked to their respective research questions.

Analysis of variance was used to evaluate strength of relationship between biographical data in section I, such as type of battalion, and data collected on each Likert scale question in section II.



# **Chapter IV**

## **Results**


The questionnaires were mailed the first week of July, 1993, to each member of the population. By August 13, the return rate stabilized at approximately 30 percent and the researcher proceeded with a second mailing. As of September 2, the response rate reached 51.6 percent and the decision was made to proceed with data analysis.

Return rates may have been higher if surveys were mailed other than during the summer, the Army's peak transfer season. Many officers could have been between duty stations during the summer, and may not have had time to complete and return questionnaires.



### **Questionnaire Part I, Demographics**

All 32 respondents were male. Infantry officers comprised 59.4 percent; 21.9 percent were armor, and 18.8 percent were aviation (see Figure 4.1). All respondents were lieutenant colonels while in command of their battalions during the war, having an average of 16 months in command at the war's end (see Figure 4.2).

Commanders averaged 19.5 years of service. The range was from 17 to 23 years with 40.6 percent of the officers having served 19 years (see Figure 4.3). The overwhelming majority of officers had no previous combat troop leading experience and those who did tended to have less than one month (see Figure 4.4).




**Figure 4.1**  
**Respondents by Branch**



**Figure 4.2**


**Time in Battalion Command During the Gulf War  
(In Months)**



17 Yrs. 18 Yrs. 19 Yrs. 20 Yrs. 21 Yrs. 22 Yrs. 23 Yrs.

**Figure 4.3**

**Total Federal Officer Service at the End of the Gulf War  
(In Years)**



**Figure 4.4**

**Combat Troop Leading Experience Prior to the Gulf War  
(In Months)**

## **Questionnaire Part II, Likert Scale**


The primary consideration when examining Likert scale results was to provide a framework for answering the research questions during discussion in the next chapter of this research. The results of data collection, therefore, are shown as they correspond to each research question.

The research questions seek information about each of the four critical aspects of command information. Questions 8-10 are concerned with information lag, 11-15 are tied to one clear voice, 16-20 deal with command information resource adequacy, and questions 21-25 look at the amount of command information training.

**Research Question 1.** Did information lag negatively affect the ability of maneuver battalion commanders to provide soldiers with adequate command information?

Responses to questions 8-10 provided data regarding the critical command information aspect, information lag. While the mean scores of these three questions may appear to indicate apathy among respondents (see Figure 4.5), further examination in the discussion section of this study revealed differences of opinion. Therefore, mean scores, alone, precluded making conclusions based on prima facie evidence.

An examination of the effects of information lag on command information was conducted by comparing the source of information troops received. This was done through the following question:



**Research Question 1. Did information lag negatively affect the ability of maneuver battalion commanders to provide soldiers with adequate command information?**

**Figure 4.5**

**Research Question 1 Subquestion Mean Scores**

Q8. News from official command information sources reached troops more rapidly than news from unofficial sources such as letters, magazines, newspapers, and phone calls home.

This question collected data that assessed the effect of information lag on command information. The mean score was 2.5 with the majority of respondents strongly disagreeing (see Table 1a).

If unofficial information reached soldiers more quickly than that from official command information products, its timeliness could have generated questions commanders were not prepared to answer.



**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	11	34.4	11	34.4
2 (D)	8	25.0	19	59.4
3 (N)	2	6.3	21	65.6
4 (A)	8	5.0	29	90.6
5 (SA)	3	9.4	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.500000	1.4368424	1.000000	5.00000

**Q8. News from official command information sources reached troops more rapidly than news from unofficial sources such as letters, magazines, newspapers, and phone calls home.**

**Table 1a**  
**Question 8 Results**

While question eight was concerned with the speed differences of command information sources, question nine dealt with effects of sources.

Question nine, "News from official information sources generated more questions from troops than news from unofficial command information sources," asked commanders to indicate agreement to determine which source of information generated the most questions from soldiers. The majority of commanders disagreed with the statement, producing a mean rating of 2.5 (see Table 1b). This indicated commanders thought unofficial sources generated more questions than official ones.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	5	15.6	5	15.6
2 (D)	20	62.5	25	78.1
3 (N)	4	12.5	29	90.6
4 (A)	0	0	0	0
5 (SA)	3	9.4	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.500000	1.0472699	1.000000	5.00000

**Q9. News from official information sources generated more questions from troops than news from unofficial command information sources.**

**Table 1b  
Question 9 Results**

Whereas question nine sought to determine which source of command information generated the most questions, question 10 dealt with the ability of commanders to answer those questions.

Question 10, "Command information products I received were current enough to allow me to adequately answer soldiers' questions concerning news items," measured the effect of command information product currency on commanders' abilities to answer soldiers' questions about issues.

Over 50 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with question 10, resulting in a mean rating of 2.5 (see Table 1c). This indicated that commanders felt command information products were not timely enough to assist them in answering soldiers' questions.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	6	18.8	6	18.1
2 (D)	11	34.4	17	53.1
3 (N)	8	25.0	25	78.1
4 (A)	7	21.9	32	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.500000	1.0472699	1.000000	4.00000

Q10. Command information products I received were current enough to allow me to adequately answer soldiers' questions concerning news items.

**Table 1c**  
**Question 10 Results**


Question 10 was the last question in the series designed to answer the first research question. The next five questions, 11-15, collected data to answer research question two, which is associated with the one clear voice concept.

**Research Question 2.** Did maneuver battalion commanders think they spoke with one clear voice when they provided soldiers with command information?

An overview of mean scores for questions 11-15 (see Figure 4.6), shows responses for all five questions fell on the agree side of the scale.

The first question in this series, question 11, "When I answered soldiers' questions regarding news items, I felt I was in agreement with official Army policy," measured how well commanders felt they spoke with one clear voice as a member of the chain of command.

The most frequently occurring response was agree with a mean rating of 3.69 (see Table 2a). This indicated commanders knew the official Army stance on issues and answered soldiers' questions accordingly.



**Research Question 2. Did maneuver battalion commanders think they spoke with one clear voice when they provided soldiers with command information?**

**Figure 4.6**

### **Research Question 2 Subquestion Mean Scores**

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	1	3.1	1	3.1
2 (D)	2	6.3	3	9.4
3 (N)	7	21.6	10	31.3
4 (A)	18	56.3	28	87.5
5 (SA)	4	12.5	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	3.687500	0.8957786	1.000000	5.00000

**Q11. When I answered soldiers' questions regarding news items, I felt I was in agreement with official Army policy.**

**Table 2a**  
**Question 11 Results**



While question 11 measured opinion regarding the one clear voice concept in the context of the chain of command, question 12 was designed to be direction oriented.

Question 12, "When I provided troops with news and answered their questions, I felt confident I was giving them the same answers troops in other maneuver battalions were receiving," measured commanders' opinions about one clear voice in the lateral dimension.

The most frequent response was agree with a mean rating of 3.69 (see Table 2b). This indicated that commanders thought if soldiers compared answers to questions about news with soldiers in adjacent units, they would have gotten similar answers.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	0	0	0	0
2 (D)	2	6.3	3	9.4
3 (N)	8	25.0	10	31.3
4 (A)	20	62.5	30	93.8
5 (SA)	2	6.3	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	3.687500	0.6927039	2.000000	5.00000

Q12. When I provided troops with news and answered their questions, I felt confident I was giving them the same answers troops in other maneuver battalions were receiving.

**Table 2b**  
**Question 12 Results**

In the same way question 12 collected data about one clear voice in the lateral dimension, question 13 collected data regarding how commanders viewed themselves.

Question 13, "I considered myself as a source of official Army policy when answering soldiers' questions regarding news items," sought to determine if commanders felt they were speaking for the Army when answering soldiers' questions.

The most frequently occurring response was agree with a mean rating of 4.0, and 84 percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed (see Table 2c).

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	1	3.1	1	3.1
2 (D)	1	3.1	2	6.3
3 (N)	3	9.4	5	15.6
4 (A)	19	59.4	24	75.0
5 (SA)	8	25.0	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	4.000000	0.8798827	1.000000	5.00000

Q13. I considered myself as a source of official Army policy when answering soldiers' questions regarding news items.

**Table 2c**  
**Question 13 Results**

While question 13 asked commanders to rate themselves as official sources, question 14 concentrated on command information products.

Question 14, "The command information products I received allowed me to give soldiers official Army views concerning news events," measured how well command information products aided commanders in speaking with one clear voice. The most frequently occurring response was agree with a mean rating of 3.09 (see Table 2d). This indicated commanders felt command information products contained information that assisted them in giving soldiers an official Army position on news events.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	3	9.4	3	9.4
2 (D)	5	15.6	8	25.0
3 (N)	11	34.4	19	59.4
4 (A)	12	37.5	31	96.9
5 (SA)	1	3.1	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	3.093750	1.0273478	1.000000	5.00000

**Q14. The command information products I received allowed me to give soldiers official Army views concerning news events.**

**Table 2d  
Question 14 Results**

While question 14 assessed command information products and the one clear voice concept, question 15 looked for one clear voice up the chain of command. Question 15, "If I had heard answers to soldiers' questions given by my superior commanders at brigade, division, and corps, their answers would have been much like mine," therefore, explores one clear voice in the vertical dimension.

The most frequent response was agree with a mean rating of 3.93, and 84 percent of respondents selected either agree or strongly agree (see Figure 2e). This indicates commanders felt the official army position on news events was consistent up the chain of command.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	0	0	0	0
2 (D)	3	9.4	3	9.4
3 (N)	2	6.3	5	15.6
4 (A)	21	65.6	26	81.3
5 (SA)	6	18.8	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	3.937500	0.80070538	2.000000	5.00000

Q15. If I had heard answers to soldiers' questions given by my superior commanders at brigade, division, and corps, their answers would have been much like mine.

**Table 2e**  
**Question 15 Results**




Question 15 was the last question associated with research question two and the critical command information aspect of one clear voice. The next five questions, 16-20, collected data about research question three and the critical command information aspect of product and resource adequacy.

**Research Question 3.** Were command information products and resources available to maneuver battalion commanders adequate?

An overview of research question three's mean scores, shows that responses, for the most part, fell on the disagree side of the scale (see Figure 4.7).

The first question in this series is question 16, "Command information products provided to me were of sufficient quality to give adequate answers to soldiers' questions about current events."

Question 16 measured commanders' impressions about command information product quality. The most frequent response was disagree with a mean rating of 2.62, and 56 percent of respondents selected disagree or strongly disagree (see Table 3a). Thus, the majority of commanders were not satisfied with command information product quality.



**Research Question 3. Were command information products and resources available to maneuver battalion commanders adequate?**

**Figure 4.7**

**Research Question 3 Subquestion Mean Scores**

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**  
**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	6	18.8	6	18.8
2 (D)	12	37.5	18	56.3
3 (N)	3	9.4	21	65.6
4 (A)	10	31.3	31	96.9
5 (SA)	1	3.1	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.625000	1.2115040	1.000000	5.00000

Q16. Command information products provided to me were of sufficient quality to give adequate answers to soldiers' questions about current events.

**Table 3a**  
**Question 16 Results**

The next question in this series dealing with command information product and resource adequacy is question 17, "There were sufficient quantities of command information products available for soldiers."

This question collected data regarding the adequacy of command information product quantities. The most frequent response was disagree with a mean rating of 2.5, and 66 percent of respondents chose disagree or strongly disagree (see Figure 3b). Commanders, therefore, felt there were not enough command information products available to soldiers.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	7	21.9	7	21.9
2 (D)	14	43.8	21	65.6
3 (N)	7	21.9	28	87.5
4 (A)	4	12.5	32	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.500000	0.9503819	1.000000	4.00000

**Q17. There were sufficient quantities of command information products available for soldiers.**

**Table 3b**  
**Question 17 Results**

While question 17 explored command information product availability, question 18 collected data regarding product credibility.

Question 18, "Soldiers viewed government-produced command information products such as division newspapers, and Armed Forces Radio to be as credible as civilian media," asked commanders to rate how credible soldiers viewed official command information products. The most frequent response was agree with a mean rating of 3.53, and 69 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (see Table 3c).

This indicates that commanders felt their troops believed government-produced products were as credible as their civilian counterparts. This question is the only one in the series dealing with command information products and resources where the majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	2	6.3	2	6.3
2 (D)	4	12.5	6	18.8
3 (N)	4	12.5	10	31.3
4 (A)	19	59.4	29	90.6
5 (SA)	3	9.4	32	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	3.531250	1.0467885	1.000000	5.00000

**Q18. Soldiers viewed government produced command information products such as division newspapers, and Armed Forces Radio to be as credible as civilian media.**

**Table 3c**  
**Question 18 Results**

The next question in the product and resource adequacy series is question 19, "I had adequate resources (mobile computer systems, tactical facsimile machines, copying machines, portable radios, etc.) to assist me in providing command information to my soldiers."

This question assessed commanders' impressions regarding adequacy of equipment used to provide soldiers with command information. The most frequent response was strongly disagree with a mean rating of 2.06, and 74 percent of commanders selected disagree or strongly disagree (see Table 3d).

This indicates that nearly three-fourths of all maneuver commanders felt they did not have the equipment necessary to provide soldiers with command information.



**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	12	38.7	12	38.7
2 (D)	11	35.5	23	74.2
3 (N)	3	9.7	26	83.9
4 (A)	4	12.9	30	96.8
5 (SA)	1	3.2	31	100.0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
31	2.064516	1.1528366	1.000000	5.00000

**Q19. I had adequate resources (mobile computer systems, tactical facsimile machines, copying machines, portable radios, etc.) to assist me in providing command information to my soldiers.**

**Table 3d**  
**Question 19 Results**

The final question in the series dealing with command information product and resource adequacy is question 20, "The command information products and resources available to me as a maneuver battalion commander were adequate for future conflicts of a similar nature."

This question assessed commander's opinions about command information product and resource adequacy in future conflicts. The most frequent response was strongly disagree with a mean rating of 2.06, and 71 percent of commanders selected disagree or strongly disagree (see Table 3e).

The majority of commanders, therefore, indicated command information products and resources are inadequate for future conflicts similar to the Gulf War.

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	13	41.9	13	41.9
2 (D)	9	29.0	22	71.0
3 (N)	3	9.7	25	80.6
4 (A)	6	19.4	31	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
31	2.064516	1.1528366	1.000000	4.00000

**Q20. The command information products and resources available to me as a maneuver battalion commander were adequate for future conflicts of a similar nature.**

**Table 3e  
Question 20 Results**

The final set of questions was used to answer research question four, which dealt with the critical command information aspect of training.


**Research Question 4.** Did maneuver battalion commanders receive adequate training regarding command information during their professional military education?

Questions 21-25 collect data regarding command information training. An overview of mean scores for these questions reveals that respondents tended to indicate neither agree nor disagree on the Likert scale (see Figure 4.8).

The first question in the series, is question 21, "The importance and relevance of command information are adequately covered in the Command and General Staff Officer Course Curriculum."

This question assessed the adequacy of command information instruction in the Command and General Staff Officer Course Curriculum. The most frequent response was neither agree nor disagree with a mean rating of 2.71 (see Table 4a).

This question asked commanders to make a judgement of their command information training and instruction. Even though the question was designed to critique instruction and training, not the individual, commanders seemed hesitant to commit to an agree or disagree response. Commanders made similar responses to the next three questions in the series as well. These questions also assess aspects of command information training and instruction.



**Research Question 4. Did maneuver battalion commanders receive adequate training regarding command information during their professional military education?**

**Figure 4.8**

**Research Question 4 Subquestion Mean Scores**

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	2	6.3	2	6.3
2 (D)	10	31.3	12	37.5
3 (N)	15	46.9	27	84.4
4 (A)	5	15.6	32	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.718750	0.8125775	1.000000	4.00000

**Q21. The importance and relevance of command information are adequately covered in the Command and General Staff Officer Course Curriculum.**

**Table 4a**  
**Question 21 Results**

Question 22 also collected data regarding the Command and General Staff Officer Course. Question 22, "Public affairs instruction given at the Command and General Staff Officer Course places as much emphasis on providing command information to soldiers as it does on how to deal with the media," asked for opinions regarding the emphasis of command information instruction.

As with the previous question, most officers opted to neither agree nor disagree with a mean rating of 2.62 (see Table 4b).

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	3	9.4	3	9.4
2 (D)	9	28.1	12	37.5
3 (N)	17	53.1	29	90.6
4 (A)	3	9.4	32	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.625000	0.7931155	1.000000	4.00000

**Q22. Public affairs instruction given at the Command and General Staff Officer Course places as much emphasis on providing command information to soldiers as it does on how to deal with the media.**

**Table 4b  
Question 22 Results**



The previous questions in this series solicited opinion about command information training and instruction at the Command and General Staff Officer Course. The next question looks at how well the School for Command Preparation addresses command information.

Question 23, "The importance and relevance of command information are adequately covered in the School for Command Preparation curriculum," seeks to determine how well command information relevance and importance are integrated into the curriculum of the School for Command Preparation.

Again, the most frequent response was neither agree nor disagree with a mean rating of 2.62 (see Table 4c).

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	3	9.4	3	9.4
2 (D)	11	34.4	14	43.8
3 (N)	13	40.6	27	84.4
4 (A)	5	15.6	32	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.625000	0.8706690	1.000000	4.00000

Q23. The importance and relevance of command information are adequately covered in the School for Command Preparation curriculum.

**Table 4c**  
**Question 23 Results**

The next question in the series also concerns the School for Command Preparation. Question 24, "Public affairs instruction given at the School for Command Preparation places as much emphasis on providing command information to soldiers as it does on how to deal with the media," asked commanders to evaluate the emphasis of command information, opposed to media relations, in the program of instruction.

As with the three previous questions in this series, the most frequent response was neither agree nor disagree with a mean rating of 2.44 (see Table 4d).

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	5	15.6	5	15.6
2 (D)	10	31.3	15	46.9
3 (N)	15	46.9	30	93.8
4 (A)	2	6.3	32	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.437500	0.800269	1.000000	4.00000

Q24. Public affairs instruction given at the School for Command Preparation places as much emphasis on providing command information to soldiers as it does on how to deal with the media.

**Table 4d**  
**Question 24 Results**

The final question of the series dealing with command information training was designed to be general in nature when assessing opinion. Question 25, "The professional military education and training of Army commanders, in general, adequately addresses the importance of command information," asked commanders to rate command information and instruction of commanders.

Unlike the previous questions in this series, this question did not deal with the specific curricula in which respondents received their command information instruction. Commanders were willing to commit to disagreement with this question. The most frequent response was disagree with a mean rating of 2.75 (see Table 4e).

**(SD) = Strongly Disagree (D) = Disagree (N) = Neither Agree nor Disagree**

**(SA) = Strongly Agree (A) = Agree**

Scale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
1 (SD)	3	9.4	3	9.4
2 (D)	12	37.5	15	46.9
3 (N)	7	21.9	22	68.8
4 (A)	10	31.3	32	100.0
5 (SA)	0	0	0	0

N	Mean	STD Dev	MIN	MAX
32	2.750000	1.0160010	1.000000	4.00000

Q25. The professional military education and training of Army commanders, in general, adequately addresses the importance of command information.

**Table 4e**  
**Question 25 Results**

### **Additional Findings**

An analysis of variance between biographical data in section one of the questionnaire and Likert scale items in section two revealed no significant relationships with one exception. Respondents indicating they commanded armor battalions disagreed with question 14 significantly more than those respondents who commanded infantry battalions.

Question 14 collected data regarding how effective command information products were in helping commanders to speak with one clear voice. Infantry commanders were significantly more satisfied with the products in this capacity than armor commanders. The comparison was significant at the 0.05 level.

## **Chapter V**

# **DISCUSSION**

### **Conclusions**

The primary consideration when drawing conclusions from data was to answer each of the four research questions. Conclusions are therefore presented according to research question. Likert Scale data from section II of the instrument are used to quantitatively answer each question.

For the purposes of discussion and illustration, the five Likert scale responses are collapsed into three categories. The categories of strongly agree and agree are combined into an "agree" response and strongly disagree and disagree into "disagree." The neither agree nor disagree category stands alone.

Selected responses from open-ended questions in section III that correspond to each research question are included to illustrate the rationale behind some of the responses.

**Research Question 1:** "Did information lag negatively affect the ability of maneuver battalion commanders to provide soldiers with adequate command information?"

A majority of commanders (63 percent) indicated information lag did negatively affect their ability to provide troops with adequate command information. Respondents indicating it did not have a negative effect totaled 22 percent and 15 percent neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 5.1).

The most serious problem created by information lag is illustrated by the re-




sponse to question nine, "News from official information sources generated more questions from troops than news from unofficial command information sources." The majority of commanders (78 percent) indicated that news from unofficial sources such as letters from home and phone calls out-paced the official news sources, thereby negatively affecting their ability to provide soldiers with adequate command information. As one armor commander commented, *"The greatest problem was access to telephones. Many rumors ran wild on both ends—the theater of operations and the CONUS bases."*

The most serious consequence of information lag appears to be that it contributes to rumors that can undermine morale. Consider what one infantry commander said:

*I felt like my family sometimes had a better handle on what was going on primarily due to CNN. My principal source of information was through the chain of command. World events were frequently through local extracts of US/British media sources in Arabian newspapers. Situation made it difficult to dispel rumors.*

The majority of commanders said information lag was a problem and that systems for providing command information must be updated to take advantage of modern technology to get information to soldiers faster. As one commander put it, *"We need to be ahead of CNN! The news media and the rapidity of their research and instant reporting often put DOD on the defensive. Our systems are old—our PAOs . . . are not aggressive. We lose the battle of information—the soldier loses confidence in his/her chain of command."*



**Research Question 1. Did information lag negatively affect the ability of maneuver battalion commanders to provide soldiers with adequate command information?**

**Figure 5.1**  
**Critical Command Information Aspect 1**  
**Information Lag**

**Research Question 2:** Did maneuver commanders think they spoke with one clear voice when they provided soldiers with command information?


Maneuver commanders seemed to understand the importance of speaking with one clear voice. As one infantry commander commented, *"A commander should only provide soldiers with official information. Providing his personal slant on official information is dangerous because his personal view may not be the same as official military correspondence, thereby disrupting unity of command."*

Commanders overwhelmingly thought they spoke with one clear voice (see Figure 5.2). The average agreement for the five sub-areas was 69.3 percent, with an average disagreement of only 11.3 percent. Commanders who neither agreed nor disagreed averaged 19.4 percent.

The highest percentage of agreement was with questions 13 and 15, each having 84.3 percent agreement. Question 13 determined if commanders considered themselves a source of official Army policy when answering soldiers questions. Question 15 asked commanders if they thought higher levels of command spoke with one clear voice.

The least percentage of agreement was with question 14, which asked if command information products aided commanders in speaking with one clear voice. Agreement totaled 40.6 percent, disagreement 25 percent, and 34.4 percent of commanders neither agreed nor disagreed.

To illustrate the importance of speaking with one clear voice and how it affects the soldiers' confidence in the chain of command, consider what one commander said:



**Research Question 2. Did maneuver battalion commanders think they spoke with one clear voice when they provided soldiers with command information?**

**Figure 5.2**  
**Critical Command Information Aspect 2**  
**One Clear Voice**

*Before notification to deploy to Desert Shield, there was no command information on unit status. All command information was cloaked in secrecy. Soldiers asked repeatedly if we were deploying to the Persian Gulf. The official Army answer was no, we were not deploying to Saudi Arabia. On 8 Nov 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney announced we would deploy to Operation Desert Shield. The soldiers and their families lost confidence in the chain of command's ability to have all command information concerning deployment to a potential war zone.*

Problems such as the one above seemed to have been resolved once the theater of operations matured and information systems were established. Commanders at all levels seemed to grasp the importance of speaking with one clear voice and based on the data collected for this study, felt they did a good job doing so. In summary, the majority of commanders indicated there was not a problem with the critical command information aspect of one clear voice during the Gulf War.

**Research Question 3.** Were command information products and resources available to maneuver battalion commanders adequate?

One of the greatest challenges of command information is providing adequate products to soldiers in a combat environment. One infantry commander said, *"Bottom line—it's broken! Commanders talking to commanders was the only source (of command information)."* This typified responses to the open-ended question regarding the critical command information aspect of product adequacy and this is evident in corresponding Likert scale questions as well.

The preponderance of commanders, 57 percent, were dissatisfied with command information product adequacy. Respondents indicating satisfaction totaled

30 percent and 13 percent neither agreed nor disagreed.

Of the five questions dealing with the critical command information aspect of resource adequacy, the responses to only one, question 18, indicated a majority of agreement (see Figure 5.3). Most of the commanders, 69 percent, said soldiers thought government-produced command information products such as division newspapers, and Armed Forces Radio were as credible as civilian media.


The greatest percentage of disagreement was with question 19. The majority of commanders, 74 percent, indicated they had inadequate equipment such as mobile computers, facsimile machines, copy machines, and portable radios in providing command information to soldiers.

Almost as strong as the response to the question above was the one to question 20. Most of the commanders, 71 percent, indicated command information products and resources available to them would be inadequate in future conflicts of a similar nature.

Commanders were dissatisfied with the quality and quantity of products, 56 percent and 66 percent, respectively. One infantry commander said they were *"Never timely enough and never in sufficient quantities to reach the troops. It was the same in Vietnam, Desert Storm and more recently in Somalia."*

Another commander said, *"Quality--average. Quantity--never enough. Availability--rear echelon soldiers always get it first. Combat soldiers see it two weeks later. Content--average (a lot of fluff)."*

In summary, maneuver commanders indicated government-produced command information resources and products were inadequate. However, commanders



Research Question 3. Were command information products and resources available to maneuver battalion commanders adequate?

**Figure 5.3**  
**Critical Command Information Aspect 3**  
**Command Information Resource Adequacy**

responded their troops thought government-produced command information products were as credible as civilian media.

**Research Question 4.** Did maneuver battalion commanders receive adequate training regarding command information during their professional military education?

An examination of the results of research question four, the critical command information aspect of training (see Figure 5.4), yielded the highest percentage of neither agree nor disagree of all the research questions (42 percent).

However, more than twice as many commanders indicated problems with command information training (42 percent) as those satisfied (16 percent). One commander commented, "*. . . This is an area we need a lot of work. I've had about three hours instruction in this area--two hours at the Army War College . . .*"

Another said, "*This block of instruction must be expanded. My education to present has been vastly lacking.*"

This deficiency in training is evident in examining responses in question 24 (adequacy of command information instruction at the school for command preparation) and 25 that measures satisfaction with command information training in general. The majority of commanders indicated dissatisfaction with training (47 percent for questions 24 and 25) compared to those indicating satisfaction (question 24, 6 percent; question 25, 31 percent).

More than twice as many commanders responding to question 21 (adequacy of command information instruction received at the Command and General Staff




Officer Course) were dissatisfied as compared with those satisfied (38 percent to 16 percent, respectively).

Commanders seemed hesitant to comment on the adequacy of their command information training obtained at service schools, with 53 percent neither agreeing nor disagreeing with question 22. However, a strong difference of opinion is evident if neither agree nor disagree responses are omitted from question 22 results. Commanders indicated by a four-to-one margin that command information instruction given at the Command and General Staff Officer Course placed too much emphasis on media relations and not enough on command information (see Figure 5.4).

A similar difference of opinion may be seen after omitting neither agree nor disagree responses from question 23 results. Seventy-two percent of commanders responded that the importance and relevance of command information are not adequately covered in the School for Command Preparation curriculum.

To summarize responses associated with research question four, dealing with the critical command information aspect of training, 42 percent of commanders responded their professional military education and training in command information was lacking, 16 percent indicated it was adequate, and 42 percent chose to neither agree nor disagree.

If those commanders choosing to neither agree nor disagree are omitted, 73 percent of respondents indicated their professional military education and training in command information was inadequate.



**Research Question 4. Did maneuver battalion commanders receive adequate training regarding command information during their professional military education?**

**Figure 5.4**  
**Critical Command Information Aspect 4**  
**Command Information Training**

## **Synopsis of Conclusions**

To more clearly illustrate an aggregate picture of how maneuver commander responses were used to answer the four research questions, combined agreement responses are compared to combined disagreement responses in percentage format.

Some commanders appeared hesitant to commit to agreement or disagreement. This is possibly because they did not want to criticize the Army as an institution, or possibly they did not understand the question(s). Therefore, after omitting responses of neither agree nor disagree and averaging subquestion scores, the following conclusions were made:

**Research Question 1.** Did Information lag negatively affect the ability of maneuver battalion commanders to provide soldiers with adequate command information?

Answer: Yes, 74 percent.

**Research Question 2:** Did maneuver commanders think they spoke with one clear voice when they provided soldiers with command information?

Answer: Yes, 86 percent.

**Research Question 3.** Were command information products and resources available to maneuver battalion commanders adequate?

Answer: No, 65 percent.

**Research Question 4.** Did maneuver battalion commanders receive adequate training regarding command information during their professional military education?

Answer: No, 73 percent.

### **Recommendations**

Of the four critical aspects of command information, maneuver battalion commanders indicated satisfaction with only one, the ability for the chain of command to speak with one clear voice. Problems with two others, information lag and resource adequacy, can be reduced by using existing technology and products.

Maneuver battalions are equipped with tactical facsimile machines, capable of receiving daily composite news briefs such as The Early Bird, (see Appendix C) that carry current news stories compiled from major daily newspapers. These publications can then be reproduced and distributed to subordinate units. The durability of printed materials and the capability for a single copy to be read by many soldiers makes this medium especially viable in a combat zone.

Because no physical distribution system is involved in getting the publications to maneuver battalions, the burden on ground and air logistics systems is practically eliminated. These publications will not fall victim to a logistics system that places priority on ammunition, food, spare parts and medical supplies. Because they are distributed electronically, timeliness of content is enhanced.

Because the equipment and communications network for distributing the publications is already integrated into units and possible publications such as the Early

Bird are produced anyway, the cost of implementation is negligible.

Additionally, the capability of Armed Forces Radio should be supplemented to include short-wave transmitters that will alleviate range limitations of current AM and FM equipment. This is especially significant in conflicts such as the Gulf War where units moved rapidly and covered great distances.

Because commanders indicated their professional military education and training were lacking in command information, curricula of service schools should be adjusted to include more instruction in the importance and relevance of command information. If this is not feasible, the ratio of public affairs instruction should be altered to shift some emphasis from media relations to command information.

### **Suggestions for Further Study**

There are three possibilities for further study that could build on this research. First, a replication study could be conducted, surveying combat service support (supply, administrative, etc.) battalion commanders. Because these units are closer to command information resources, information lag might be less and commanders might be more satisfied with products and resources than their maneuver counterparts. The results could be compared to those of this study for a more comprehensive look at command information effectiveness in the Gulf War.

Second, maneuver commanders who led troops in Somalia could be surveyed and the results compared to this study. Because the Somalia operation is non-traditional and of smaller scale compared to the Gulf War, knowledge could be gained regarding the effects of the locale and the nature of the operation itself on command information effectiveness.

Third, research on individual soldier perspective regarding command information during the Gulf War could be compared to this research. Differences of opinion between commanders and soldiers regarding command information effectiveness could be uncovered and an attempt made to discover why these differences exist. Marshall University Graduate Student, Captain Joseph Piek, U.S. Army, conducted research into the area of individual soldier perspective regarding command information effectiveness during the Gulf War and was compiling results as of this writing. Piek's research could be used as the comparison database for further study in this area.

## **Appendix A**

### **Instrument**

### Definitions

Command Information - News and other information provided to soldiers through command channels.

Gulf War - Both Desert Shield and Desert Storm. August 1990 to May 1991.

### Background Information

Please answer questions 1-7 on this piece of paper.

1. Please circle your basic branch:  
IN AR AV Other (Please specify here \_\_\_\_\_)
2. What is your functional area?.....\_\_\_\_\_
3. Please circle the type of unit you commanded in the Gulf War:  
IN AR AV Cav Sqdn. Other (Please specify here \_\_\_\_\_)
4. At the end of the Gulf War, how many months had you commanded your battalion/squadron? Please Circle:  
<6 6-9 10-13 14-17 18-21 22-25 26-29 >29
5. Please circle the number of years of Total Federal Officer Service you had at the end of the Gulf War:  
<15 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >24
6. Please circle the highest rank you held as a battalion/squadron commander during the Gulf War:  
CPT MAJ LTC COL
7. Please circle the number of months of combat troop-leading experience you had prior to the Gulf War:  
none <1 1 1-3 4-7 8-11 12-15 16-19 20-24 >24

Please go to the back of this page



Please use the following numerical code when responding to questions 8-25. Circle your response on this sheet.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)
<hr/>				
8. News from official command information sources reached troops more rapidly than news from unofficial sources such as letters, magazines, newspapers and phone calls home.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2 SD 1
9. News from official information sources generated more questions from troops than news from unofficial command information sources.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2 SD 1
10. Command information products I received were current enough to allow me to adequately answer soldiers' questions concerning news items.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2 SD 1
11. When I answered soldiers' questions regarding news items, I felt I was in agreement with official Army policy.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2 SD 1
12. When I provided troops with news and answered their questions, I felt confident I was giving them the same answers troops in other maneuver battalions were receiving.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2 SD 1
13. I considered myself as a source of official Army policy when answering soldiers' questions regarding news items.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2 SD 1
14. The command information products I received allowed me to give soldiers official Army views concerning news events.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2 SD 1

Please go to the next page

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)

15. If I had heard answers to soldiers' questions given by my superior commanders at brigade, division, and corps, their answers would have been much like mine.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
16. Command information products provided to me were of sufficient quality to give adequate answers to soldiers' questions about current events.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
17. There were sufficient quantities of command information products available for soldiers.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
18. Soldiers viewed government produced command information products such as <u>Stars and Stripes</u> , division newspapers, and Armed Forces Radio to be as credible as civilian media.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
19. I had adequate resources, (mobile computer systems, tactical facsimile machines, copying machines, portable radios, etc.), to assist me in providing command information to my soldiers.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
20. The command information products and resources available to me as a maneuver battalion commander were adequate for future conflicts of a similar nature.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
21. The importance and relevance of command information are adequately covered in the Command and General Staff Officer Course Curriculum.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1

Please go to the back of this page

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)

22. Public affairs instruction given at the Command and General Staff Officer Course places as much emphasis on providing command information to soldiers as it does on how to deal with the media.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
23. The importance and relevance of command information are adequately covered in the School for Command Preparation curriculum.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
24. Public affairs instruction given at the School for Command Preparation places as much emphasis on providing command information to soldiers as it does on how to deal with the media.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1
25. The professional military education and training of Army commanders, in general, adequately addresses the importance of command information.	SA 5	A 4	N 3	D 2	SD 1

Please go to the next page

The following questions are voluntary. If you choose to answer, please do so on this piece of paper.

26. What are your thoughts regarding the timeliness of command information products and their effect on your ability to keep soldiers adequately informed?
27. What are your thoughts concerning the ability of all Army commanders in the Gulf War to give similar answers that were consistent with official Army views when answering soldiers' questions about news items?

Please go to the back of this page

Please answer the following questions on this piece of paper

28. What are your thoughts about government produced command information products with respect to quality, quantity, availability, and content?
29. Please make some observations regarding how much your professional military education and training emphasized the command information aspect of public affairs in proportion to dealing with the media.

Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions.  
Please return in the self-addressed, stamped envelope by  
21 June, 1993.

## **Appendix B**

### **Responses to Open-Ended Questions**

**Q26, "What are your thoughts regarding the timeliness of command information products and their effect on your ability to keep soldiers informed?"**

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 63.**

*"They are absolutely essential to maintain high levels of morale in any unit. Soldiers today are intelligent and inquisitive. They want to know what is going on around them and why. They deserve to know."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 62.**

*"There needs to be a more timely capability afforded to our commanders in the field (especially, under combat conditions) to provide updates on current global, domestic and military issues! An 'Electronic Mail' network that interfaces with tactical computers would do, until something better is invented"*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 68.**

*"In my unit, written command information was not timely and we were out of range of the Armed Forces Radio Network. Therefore, for current information about the world situation, we relied on BBC's world service. The chain of command did the best it could under the circumstance."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 69.**

*"We were told only what CENTCOM wanted us to know. No more, No less. Rumors were rampant. Verbal command information was the primary source of command information. Few if any written/publish of products were available."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number six.**

*"Information came verbally. Command and staff meeting, over the radio (short wave/civilian front). Official products were non-existent."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 45.**

*"Seems like every tank crew had their own radio. Do you need to emphasize information products produced by the government when you have CNN and BBC?? The chain of command is solely responsible for command information--everything else is too cumbersome to be timely."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 24.**

*"Basically, I received none in the Gulf. We had no TV, only BBC in the radio, and a frequent Stars and Stripes. Everything we heard of official command policy was second hand."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 21.**

*"The Bn/Bde must take proactive steps to keep 'Joe' up to date. NEVER BLOW SMOKE--Give honest answers. Do it early on--do it often. Set up club information board. Designate a serious-minded, rumor control TM (off/NCO/ENL) to deal with Rumors."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 37.**

*"Beyond Stars and Stripes, I received no command information products. Consider this survey ludicrous since it assumes CI reached me."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 14.**

*"Stars and Stripes was good."*

**Infantry Commander**

*"Information flow is the single most important thing that soldiers have to depend on. It was totally inadequate and resulted in me giving a great deal of opinion opposed to official sources."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 70.**

*"CMD information was virtually non-existent in the desert. We never got written CMD information products other than an occasional Early Bird from the Pentagon."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number four.**

*"Their major focus was up and toward the media not down to the soldiers...Nightly Command and Staff meetings at my higher HQ was the only thing that kept me informed, but often didn't cover the bigger picture or details of things important to soldiers."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 44.**

*"Not timely, in fact non-existent is more like it. Do not do the job because you don't have it soon enough. I felt like I never knew enough soon enough to tell my soldiers what the truth was, I had to assume that what I said was the correct army policy."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 16.**

*"Printed products not available"*

*"Verbal information only"*

*"No newspapers or radio available except BBC"*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 33.**

*"Once deployed west to Rahfa, we never had enough papers and were out of range of Armed Forces Radio. We exclusively used BBC."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number seven.**

*"Unfortunately, it has been over two years and I, frankly, cannot remember much about command information material."*



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A SURVEY OF THE COMMAND INFORMATION FUNCTION IN US ARMY  
MANEUVER BATTALIONS DURING THE GULF WAR(U) MARSHALL  
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**Infantry Commander, respondent number 20.**

*"I rarely received products."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number three.**

*"Always too little and too late! Primary news/current events were primarily from VOA and BBC, both of which were available to soldiers in theater on privately-owned, commercial portable radios. AFRTS radio was not available until late in reaching troops (dispersion), and were not available in sufficient quantity."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 15.**

*"They were always late, and too little of them!"*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 40.**

*"The best source of what was happening in the world and in some cases the theater was BBC and later AFN radio. CMD information was a better source for and into simply because of the difficulty in obtaining Stars and Stripes--this was and should be expected for primitive materials of this nature. The greatest problem was access to telephones--many rumors ran wild on both ends--the theater of operations and the conus bases."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 27.**

*"I was pleased--given the situation of being stretched out in the command information during Desert Shield/Storm. The things I didn't know (especially during Desert Shield) I felt no one else knew either (Brigade/Division/Corps Commanders). NO COMPLAINTS."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 46.**

*"Did not get much of anything! In fact, I can't remember any 'official' stuff at all. We were able to get some newspapers, but not very current."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 64.**

*"Before notification to deploy to Desert Shield, there was no command informa-*

*tion on unit status. All command information was cloaked in secrecy. Soldiers asked repeatedly if we were deploying to the Persian Gulf. The official Army answer was no, we were not deploying to Saudi Arabia. On 8 Nov 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney announced we would deploy to Operation Desert Shield. The soldiers and their families lost confidence in the chain of command's ability to have all command information concerning deployment to a potential war zone."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 22.**

*"Too slow. In ODS, we listened to CNN, radio and BBC. That's where our info came from."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 17.**

*"We need to be ahead of CNN! The news media and the rapidity of their research and instant reporting often put DOD on the "defensive". Our systems are old--our PAOs of alike [sic] are not aggressive. We lose the battle of information--the soldiers loses confidence in his/her chain of command."*

**"Infantry Commander, respondent number 13.**

*"It was several years since I graduated from CGSC. But as I recall, the command information program portion of the curriculum was under emphasized. I felt like my family sometimes had better handles on what was going on primarily due to CNN. My principal source of information was through chain of command. World events were frequently through local extracts of US/British media sources in Arabian newspapers. Situation made it difficult to dispel rumors."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 30.**

*"The only thing in the Gulf War which would have helped is a distribution of tapes of the nightly briefing provided by CENTCOM. I never saw these until I got home."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 11.**

*"In real world situations, they are inadequate."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 52.**

*"CNN is here to stay--we should use it and broadcast to all units."*

**Question 27, "What are your thoughts concerning the ability of all Army commanders in the Gulf War to give similar answers that were consistent with official Army views when answering soldiers' questions about news items?"**

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 63.**

*"Inconsistent responses can give false impressions of the capabilities and dedication of the chain of command. Maintaining credibility is essential."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 62.**

*"A very difficult task. Telephones, letters from home with hometown views on the War, etc., made a commander's task of speaking in one voice difficult. The best we could do is take a composite data base and provide our 'best' answer to our troops and always say--this was our best answer, not necessarily the 'official one.'"*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 68.**

*"Your use of the term 'official army views' angers me, because the term is petty in nature when one considers what my soldiers were facing. I assured the soldiers that the government bureaucracy would do its best to treat them fairly and focused on current events. I found my soldiers committed to the mission and each other--not on the mundane nature of performance rates, pay increases or tour length in the Gulf. After seven months in the desert with no normal living facilities, my soldiers wanted to get home, above all else, through Kuwait!"*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 69.**

*"Excellent"*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number six.**

*"Leaders, good leaders, answered their soldiers' questions as best they could."*

*Good leadership is instinctive in regards to command information. Don't clutter curriculum with 'command information.' Concentrate all our limited resources of time and money on winning the next war. We need warriors not command information literate managers. Commanders have PAO's just for this purpose."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 45.**

*"Extremely accurate—better than any previous war and it will continue to get better because the 'world is getting smaller' in communications!"*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 24.**

*"It's needed, but was not available."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 21.**

*"S and S and AFN were great in the rear but once you left Dhrahan you (the soldier) lost reception. BBC became the station of choice because it was the only one."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 37.**

*"Believe commanders in my division provided best information possible and were reasonably consistent."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 54.**

*"Commander should only provide soldier with official information. Providing his personal slant on official information is dangerous because his personal view may not be the same as official military correspondence, thereby disrupting unity of command."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 14.**

*"Depended on the commander's background and preparation."*

**Infantry Commander**

*"They also had to use personal experience, opinion, listen to BBC, AFN. The lack of specific information was probably the most frustrating thing about ODS/S."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number four.**

*"Inconsistent."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 44.**

*"We were lucky to receive one Stars and Stripes every two or three days in the whole battalion. AFRTS wasn't where we were so shortwave and the BBC or VOA was our source. We were on our own. The command information system was broken big time."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 16.**

*"Command information-verbal only. Consistent within the Division."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 33.**

*"I have no idea."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number seven.**

*"I don't remember it being a problem. Word was sent via chain of command and I believe we were putting out the same information."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 20.**

*"I had to trust entirely word of mouth from my commander."*

**Infantry Commander.**

*"Broken! What was thought to be generally understood by 'all' was limited to the span of control of the unit chain of command, and what was shared from listening to radio news broadcasts. Rumors abounded."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 15.**

*"It was good, but it came through the chain of command versus any command information program."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 40.**

*"I don't remember this as an issue. From deployment in Jan 91 to the end of the cease fire negotiations in March, there was little command information into other than that generated by the division. Stars and Stripes and shortwave radio were the best products outside of the chain of command. I believe soldiers' questions were answered in the same way by commanders."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 27.**

*"Very consistent as far as I know."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 46.**

*"Hard to do!"*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 64.**

*"This was handled well within 1st Armored Division. Daily and nightly briefings ensured all commanders spoke with one voice about current events."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 22.**

*"Very Important."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 17.**

*"The 'party line' was never really defined by the chain of command. Also, the media's access to everyone, at any time, makes it extremely difficult. There are always 'loose cannons' who have their own agendas--both in the press and in uniform."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 13.**

*"By and large, this was done well. However, as General Maller's pre-emptive comments suggest, it was difficult at times. The unit PAO generic bulletin provide minimal relief. But I am not sure a play-by-play account of changing events and policies is necessary. The appetite for soldiers to have information was tremendous. Very frequently, I ended up repeating well known policies or positions."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 52.**

*"No comment."*

**Question 28, "What are your thoughts about government produced command information products with respect to quality, quantity, availability, and content?"**

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 63.**

*"Never enough, incomplete. Outdated information."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 62.**

*"Same comment as before--need to be more timely and accessible to commanders under field/combat conditions."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 68.**

*"Maintain current quality and availability. Situations, as in my unit's case, will always occur infrequently- and the soldier understands."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 69.**

*"Saw none."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 45.**

*"Too slow. Furthermore, many of their products place an increased burden on an overtaxed transportation and distribution system. We couldn't get tank parts but AAFES was always there."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 24.**

*"Basically, I received none in the Gulf. We had no TV, only BBC in the radio and a frequent Stars and Stripes. Every- thing we heard of official command policy was second-hand."*



**Infantry Commander, respondent number 21.**

*"Quality, good when available. Quantity--never enough. Content--very good, except the news usually dealt with REMF topics like dances, ice cream socials, etc. The editors need to keep audience in mind."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 37.**

*"Didn't see any."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 14.**

*"Again, Stars and Stripes was well done and well received."*

**Infantry Commander**

*"Saw next to none."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 70.**

*"Never saw them."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number four.**

*"Bottom line--it's broken!" Commanders talking to commanders was the only source. We didn't seem to have specialists in the PAO/Command info field. Question: In your experience, how aggressive does the PAO pursue gathering a story? My experience is that the battalion commander has to contact PAO for coverage of an event (EIB, EFMB) then cajole them into covering it and often needs to take the photo or write the copy. Do you think the Washington Post operates under this basis? Our system is set up backwards. The customer has to initiate news/information coverage instead of the reverse. The PAO has access to G3 training and protocol. Why can't they stay on top of what's going on and initiate action with a unit for coverage?"*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 44.**

*Availability, poor. Division level papers did not discuss policy, only what division units were doing. We swapped corps papers. I saw the VII corps Jayhawk and its quality looked pretty good. Just wasn't there when it was needed."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 16.**

*"Not available."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 33.**

*"Quality, ok. Quantity, not nearly enough, same with availability. Content, ok."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number seven.**

*"Seemed adequate."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 20.**

*"Saw very little."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number three.**

*"Never timely enough and never in sufficient quantities to reach the troops. It was the same in Vietnam, Desert Storm and more recently Somalia."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 15.**

*"Did not see enough of them to make a judgement. As stated, what we received was very little, very late."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 40.**

*"Not sufficient. Again, radio was best."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 27.**

*"Good, details as necessary."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 46.**

*"N/A for Gulf War period."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 64.**

*"I never really saw any government produced command information products during Desert Shield Storm. All information was passed by word of mouth through the chain of command."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 22.**

*"Pulp."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 17.**

*"Quality, average. Quantity--never enough. Availability, rear echelon soldiers always get it first. Combat soldiers see it two weeks later. Content, average (a lot of fluff)."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 13.**

*"Government produced command information is necessary... Quality and timeliness are issues that concern me. With new facsimile capabilities this should improve."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 30.**

*"Ok."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 11.**

*"In real world situations, they are inadequate."*

**Question 29, "Please make some observations regarding how much your professional military education and training emphasized the command information aspect of public affairs in proportion to dealing with the media."**

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 63.**

*"Only scratched the surface at CGSC and PCC. Learned on the job."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 62.**

*"Military education stresses 'media relations' more, than the importance of being able to provide factual answers to your troops in a timely manner. Remember, media has access to \$1 million dollars plus electronic systems to get and send their information around the world; we commanders had a fraction of that capability."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 68.**

*"Sufficiently."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 69.**

*"I had little if any professional training."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 45.**

*"Choose not to compare--command information training is part of leadership training. Dealing with the media is a structured approach of rules and techniques--do's and don'ts."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 24.**

*"Media, great. Command information, next to none."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 21.**

*"I was ready between IOAC, CGSC, PCC and had great mentors. I was ready and my SI hated it."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 37.**

*"Sufficient for the task but really relied on common sense."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 14.**

*"Very little help."*

**Infantry Commander.**

*"Little emphasis used a good deal. I felt reasonably prepared however."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 70.**

*"There has been very little instruction on command information in my professional military education (FA officers basic course, Infantry officers course and CGSC). The only instruction I have received was on how to deal with the media."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 44.**

*"Not enough. All of a sudden, we were forced with dealing with the media and we had to wing it with little or no training. My Brigade Commander did not want to talk to any media (he was a product of RVN experiences) so he sent things straight to the brigade commanders. I had three reporters live with my unit for two weeks. We worked it out but it was not easy. We have to realize that our wars of the future will all be media wars. There will be satellite capability for real time transmission of events at BN level. We need to be ready for this in the future."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 33.**

*"Not much. But within the command they allowed troops to talk to the media without censorship, counting on their ability to be honest and frank."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 16.**

*"POE sufficient."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number seven.**

*"I think we are doing much better here. We had a good exposure to the subject matter at the War College. I would emphasize, however, that if we are giving the subject short shift at the Basic and Advance Courses, we are missing the mark."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 20.**

*"Balance should exist. In-depth discussion should occur in our school system. The current school presentations lack depth, balance and sophistication."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number three.**

*"Hardly at all. Most of what I know I know from dealing with PAOs in troop units."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 15.**

*"Very little. As you stated, most of it is concerned with how commanders should handle the media, not what is available for soldiers or how to get it."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 40.**

*"Zero, This is an area we need a lot of work. I've had about three hours instruction in this area--two hours at the Army War College. Making this a training event at the NTC is a step in the right direction to correcting this problem/shortcoming!"*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 27.**

*"Most of public relations and command information is common sense and good leadership. More training in dealing with the media, though, should be included at CGSC and in pre-command courses."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 46.**

*"No real 'emphasis' but not sure it is needed. Leadership has an implicit task keeping soldiers informed. The army did a poor job in the Gulf. More education would not have fixed it."*

**Aviation Commander, respondent number 64.**

*"Training in the army for dealing with the media is woefully inadequate. Most commanders would rather not talk to the media as they see them as much the enemy as a battlefield foe. This suspicion is due to a lack of professional military education in interfacing with the press and the common viewpoint in the United States that our media is a left wing liberal organization whose views are not shared by main-stream America and conservative military officers."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 17.**

*"Schools do not deal with media relations of CI. The AWC was the first time I really received a good dose of media dealing training."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 13.**

*"This block of instruction must be expanded. My education to present has been vastly lacking."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 30.**

*"Recently, it has been very good. Five years ago, not so good."*

**Infantry Commander, respondent number 11.**

*"If I were not a 46 functional area officer, I would be woefully unprepared."*

**Armor Commander, respondent number 52.**

*"Need much much more--start in basic course and continue forever. should be a block on field grade OER.."*

## **Appendix C**

**Sample Early Bird**



# EARLY BIRD

TUESDAY, February 23, 1993

WASHINGTON TIMES

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## Aspin oversees urgent issues from Georgetown hospital

By Bill Gertz  
The Washington Times

Defense Secretary Les Aspin, President Clinton's only Pentagon appointee, spent a second night at the hospital yesterday after experiencing shortness of breath caused by a heart condition.

The Pentagon said in a statement issued last night that Mr. Aspin, 54, was in stable condition at Georgetown University Hospital.

Secure communications links have been set up in Mr. Aspin's hospital room and "he will deal with urgent matters that arise during his stay," the statement said.

Mr. Aspin will remain at the hospital for "further tests and evaluation," the statement said.

LT. Cmdr. Joe Gradisher said in a statement yesterday that Mr. Aspin has not been forced to relinquish his place in the national command authority because of the illness.

"He has not been relieved of his duties," Cmdr. Gradisher said.

Under the U.S. national command authority — the power to take military action with troops or strategic missiles — Mr. Aspin is second in line to President Clinton. He is the official in the chain of command who sends orders to field commanders.

During the Persian Gulf war, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney was the official who transmitted orders to the theater commander, Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf.

If Mr. Aspin should be relieved of command authority due to illness, Undersecretary of the Army John W. Shannon, a holdover from the Bush administration, would be in line to be acting defense secretary, defense experts said.

William Perry, deputy defense secretary-designate, has not been confirmed by the Senate, and other senior defense officials have not been named by the president yet.

Earlier yesterday, Pentagon officials described Mr. Aspin's condition as "clearly improved."

"His personal physicians diagnosed his difficulty as the interaction of a fever caused by immunization shots with an underlying heart condition," the statement said.

Two years ago, the secretary was diagnosed with a condition known as hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, or an abnormal thickening of the heart muscle that can interfere with blood flow.

"While the abnormality can have serious implications, his condition is being managed by medication," the statement said.

An aide to Mr. Aspin said the shortness of breath was caused by a reaction to a typhoid immunization injection the secretary received Saturday in anticipation of a trip abroad.

"He did not have a heart attack. He got dehydrated, feverish and short of breath after the typhoid shot," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

As a result of the illness, Mr. Aspin postponed plans for the trip to visit U.S. troops at an unidentified destination overseas, the official told Reuters news agency.

Mr. Aspin was conscious and alert yesterday and remained in control of the Pentagon, aides to the secretary said.

Mr. Aspin was first stricken with the heart condition in 1991 during a skiing vacation in Colorado.

At that time, he was placed in intensive care. Later, he arranged to have the Pentagon provide a plane to

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NEW YORK TIMES

Feb. 23, 1993 Pg. 1

## CLINTON TO FIGHT FOREIGN SUBSIDIES

Says Laid-Off Workers Aren't to Blame for Industry Ills

By GWEN IFILL

Sourced to The New York Times

EVERETT, Wash., Feb. 22 — President Clinton today told an audience of aeronautics workers, many of them threatened with the loss of their jobs, that their livelihoods were imperiled because of unfair foreign competition, and that the Federal Government would help them.

At other stops on his road trip to promote his economic plan, Mr. Clinton has appealed for support for the tax increases that are its major feature. But this time the message was one of reassurance.

Mr. Clinton spoke at the Boeing aircraft headquarters here, where managers announced last week that they would lay off 28,000 workers in the next 18 months. The President said that employees were not to blame for their plight and that unfair foreign competition had undercut their industry.

The President was especially critical of European subsidies for Airbus, the multibillion-dollar project that has left Boeing and McDonnell Douglas scrambling.

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## CLINTON PROPOSES CHANGES IN POLICY TO AID TECHNOLOGY

EXPANDING FEDERAL ROLE

4-Year, \$17 Billion Effort Would Include Joint U.S.-Industry Programs for Research

By JOHN MARKOFF

Sourced to The New York Times

MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif., Feb. 22 — The Clinton Administration announced today a broad new technology initiative that enthusiastically embraces Government and industry cooperation to create new technologies and nurture innovative small companies.

The program could lead to a significant change in the balance between civilian and military research and development and could generate new Government-industry consortiums modeled after a successful consortium created six years ago to help the flagging semiconductor industry.

"The underlying spirit is that it is time we got away from such an adversarial relationship between the Government and the private sector," said Dr. Jack Gibbons, the President's science advisor and the head of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. "Where our interests are mutual and line up, let's go for it."

Price: \$17 Billion

The technology initiative was outlined today by President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore in an appearance before high-tech workers at the headquarters of Silicon Graphics Inc., a computer manufacturer here.

It calls for spending \$17 billion over four years and includes money to transform a Commerce Department agency to serve as a civilian focal point for incubating advanced technologies. The money for the programs was part of the President's economic plan an-

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WASHINGTON POST

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## Momentum for Airdrop To Aid Bosnia Increases

By Barton Gellman  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Momentum continued to build yesterday for a U.S. plan to parachute relief supplies into eastern Bosnia despite growing qualms at the United Nations and a near-consensus among Pentagon planners that the move would be inefficient,

expensive and risky for aircraft and Bosnian allies.

The Clinton administration has given the airdrop its grudging endorsement, officials said, because President Clinton is determined to do something for Muslim towns besieged by Serb militias and his ad-

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# Perils Are Assessed in U.S. Airdrop of Supplies to Bosnians

By MELISSA HEALY  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON—With President Clinton expected to announce a humanitarian relief program for Bosnia-Herzegovina this week—perhaps as early as today—Administration discussions are focusing on the dangers that a potential airdrop of supplies will pose to American air crews, as well as to the beleaguered recipients of goods on the ground, officials said Monday.

These problems have led some U.S. military planners to propose the early introduction of specially trained combat troops to survey needs and plan for the safe delivery of goods to designated "drop zones."

If these "combat controllers" are deployed, they would be among the first American troops on the ground in areas outside of those secured by the United Nations in Bosnia. Some U.S. controllers are already in Sarajevo.

Details of the timetable for such a deployment remained unclear on Monday. But other details of the proposed airdrop plan did emerge Monday.

Pentagon planners said that Navy planes, patrolling from aircraft carriers off the Bosnian coast, would stand by for orders to retaliate against groundfire units or to rescue air crews if groundfire brought them down. The warplanes are not expected to escort the cargo planes to their targets but to remain out of harm's way until needed.

As American C-130 transport planes pass slowly over drop zones at altitudes as low as 400 feet, military planners say, they will be unusually vulnerable to Serbian gunfire from the ground and to Serbian aircraft that might take to the air over Bosnia.

"It's not a milk run, no doubt about it," said one Pentagon official assessing the dangers of the operations.

Airdrops, even those conducted at low altitude, also can pose a danger for desperate populations concentrated near delivery areas. In northern Iraq, where American troops conducted a massive airdrop of pallets to Kurds under Operation Provide Comfort, some Kurds were fatally crushed when gusts of wind blew the one-ton packages off course.

Pentagon planners warned that given those dangers, an airdrop operation can deliver only a fraction of

the aid that besieged Muslim populations in eastern Bosnia urgently need. Most of their needs must continue to be met by U.N. convoys traveling overland—a process that requires the political cooperation of Serbian-backed forces in Bosnia.

"This is, at best, a Band-Aid," said one Pentagon planner. "We cannot possibly provide all the needs of these communities. That has to be done on the ground. And there is a real question as to whether this will assist that process or hinder it. If you challenge the Bosnians on the airdrops, it may impede the convoys, and that doesn't help those populations at all in the long run."

As a result, Pentagon officials on Monday sought to present the President's airdrop plan as a short-term program. "This is not going to go on forever," said one senior Pentagon official. "We should think about this as a limited-duration, emergency effort to help a population that is apparently in bad shape."

Military air cargo experts said that fleets of C-130 transport planes, operating from bases in Italy, will carry as many as 16 one-ton pallets apiece into the skies over eastern Bosnia and drop the loads off the planes' back decks. From low altitudes, the pallets drop to the ground at a rate of almost 30 feet per second, their descent slowed by parachutes.

Using a computer system that takes account of wind conditions, the C-130 air crews aim to deliver their cargoes to within 200 yards of the designated drop zones. But weather and threatening groundfire can wreak havoc with the delivery of the goods.

If groundfire in the area threatens the planes, they may deliver their cargoes from high altitudes, where the aircraft are less vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. But such high-altitude drops can significantly erode the accuracy of the cargo deliveries.

In planning the Bosnia airdrop operations, Pentagon officials said, the United States has relied on information from U.N. troops and from independent aid organizations to help determine the population's needs.

But the officials said that special-operations troops, such as those that conducted extensive surveys of northern Iraq in advance of Operation Provide Comfort, could be sent in to supplement the information for the Pentagon.

That, they added, would add to the presence of U.S. combat troops on the ground in Bosnia.

3,000 Boeing employees who gathered to hear him speak in a cavernous hangar here.

"Countries which do that win," Mr. Clinton said. "Those which don't are punished. And we can no longer afford to wait for 10 years, while someone does something to us that we do not respond to."

Boeing announced recently that 28,000 of its 141,300 workers nationwide would be laid off because of declining commercial airplane sales. About 15,000 of those lost jobs are to be in Washington State. The first round of notices to employees went out here on Friday.

"I think you and I know deep in our hearts that most of these layoffs—maybe not all, because the airline industry itself has problems which are bleeding back onto you the commercial carriers—but a lot of these layoffs would not have been announced had it not been for the \$20 billion that the United States sat by and let Europe plow into Airbus over the last several years," he told the Boeing employees. "So we're going to try to change the rules of the game."

Mr. Clinton, who met privately with executives of the commercial airlines and their manufacturers after his speech here, said he supported the establishment of a commission that would examine the standing of the airline industry and would ask such a group to make suggestions to revive the industry within 90 days after it is created by Congress.

Other than that, Mr. Clinton's plans for reviving the industry and providing jobs for those who will be laid off appears to rely entirely on his ability to use the economic plan he has proposed to revive the economy as a whole.

"If we do a good job, we'll be able to find more business and bring some of them back to work," he said after he emerged from the meeting. "That's what we want to do."

By casting responsibility for the industry's problems on the Europeans instead of on problems the Federal Government could remedy by offering tax breaks or subsidies to the aircraft industry, Mr. Clinton portrayed himself as a champion of the middle-class employees who will lose their jobs here.

"Other nations follow targeted strategies and partnerships to pierce markets which you had dominated under a free market, system but which you could not compete," he said.

The audience warmly applauded Mr. Clinton, who spoke from a stage set up in front of a giant Boeing 747 still under construction.

Earlier in the day, the President praised a much smaller high-technology company in a visit to a graphics firm in California's Silicon Valley.

There, he and Vice President Al Gore announced a new technology policy that emphasizes the Government's role in encouraging cutting-edge research, development and production.

## WASHINGTON TIMES

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## Khmer Rouge troops beat U.S. observer

KOMPONG THOM, Cambodia—A U.S. military observer working with the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cambodia was beaten when briefly detained by Khmer Rouge guerrillas over the weekend, U.N. sources said yesterday.

The American officer, identified only as U.S. Navy Capt. Koellmeier, was struck on the neck and a wrist, most likely with the butt of an AK-47 assault rifle, a fellow U.N. officer said.

## CLINTON...from Pg. 1

bling to compete.  
"It is indeed ironic that the United States, which for so long has led the world in the production of airplanes and in the development of sophisticated, consumer-oriented services

An Indonesian medic based in Kompong Thom, 75 miles north of Phnom Penh, said Capt. Koellmeier was treated for neck bruises yesterday and complained of neck pain.

U.N. soldiers said it was the first time the Maoist guerrillas had deliberately hurt any of the scores of U.N. soldiers they have held captive in a series of hostage-takings going back to early December 1992.

through commercial carriers, has had three years in which more money has been lost than was made in the previous history of the airline industry," Mr. Clinton said. "And I can tell you from my study, very little of that is your fault."

Mr. Clinton and his aides made it clear that the Administration did not intend to fight subsidies with subsidies, but would seek to limit Europe's contribution to Airbus, the American aircraft industry's major competitor. The President said he had instructed the United States Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, to begin monitoring international agreements, made last year, that would limit subsidies to Airbus.

"We need a commitment not to shield ourselves from competition but to reward ourselves when we really compete and win," Mr. Clinton told

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# U.S., U.N. Apparently Agree on Somali Command Pact

■ **Africa:** Secretary General Boutros-Ghali is expected to report on the details to the Security Council next week. The United States foresees no surprises.

By STANLEY MEISLER  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON—Despite the public bickering between the United States and the United Nations over Somalia policy in recent weeks, the two sides have evidently reached agreement on a blueprint for the U.N. takeover of military operations from American forces in the ravaged, chaotic East African country.

Details will be set down in a report that Secretary General Boutros-Ghali is expected to deliver to the Security Council in a week. He has consulted with American officials extensively while preparing the report. As a result, they do not expect to be surprised or troubled in any way by his conclusions.

The plan, U.S. and U.N. sources said, does not envision a ceremonial moment when Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, the American commander, hands over the reins to Turkish Gen. Cevik Bir, the new U.N. commander who flew into Mogadishu for the first time Monday.

Instead, planners hope for a smooth, seamless, gradual take-

over. At present, there are 22,500 troops in Somalia—18,000 Americans and 14,500 from 22 other countries—all under Johnston's command.

Under the plan, each American unit, as it departs a site, will be replaced by a unit from another country that has agreed to serve under Bir's U.N. command. Although American officials hope to complete the process by the end of April or early May, military experts accustomed to the normal slow pace of U.N. operations predict that the changeover could last until June.

At full strength, the United Nations expects to have 25,000 troops under Bir, including 3,000 to 5,000 Americans assigned to logistics and support. Although not combat troops, they will represent the largest number of American troops ever serving under a foreign commander in a U.N. operation.

American military officers are reportedly not fretting about this because of four safeguards: they have a high regard for Bir and even championed his appoint-

ment. Bir's deputy commander, according to U.S. diplomats, will be an American, Army Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery. Bir himself will report to a U.N. official who will probably be American, and a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force will be kept nearby in case it must serve as a Somali rescue operation.

American officials have been complaining for weeks that Boutros-Ghali and other U.N. officials were dragging their feet on implementation of the plan. In a news conference in Mogadishu on Saturday, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, the special U.S. envoy, derided the delays in the Boutros-Ghali report and in Bir's arrival.

The United Nations has blamed the delay in issuing Boutros-Ghali's report on his official visit to Japan last week.

But Oakley, who is departing his post at the end of the month, said, "In this age of electronic communications, he could still have faxed his report to the Security Council while in Asia to speed up things."

As for Mr. Oakley said, "It is better that he is coming next week than not coming at all, but it would have been better if he had come earlier."

The delays are obviously rooted in policy differences.

Although the Pentagon has clearly wanted to pull out its troops as soon as possible, Boutros-Ghali, in his interpretation of the Security Council resolution authorizing the military intervention, has insisted that the U.S.-led operation destroy the warlords' heavy weapons before the United Nations takes over. While not accepting this as their prime mission, the Americans have engaged in a good deal of this in recent weeks.

U.S. officials have been clearly dissatisfied with the performance of the secretary general's special representative on the scene, Imad Khatami of Iraq, who is giving up the post now because of prolonged illness.

Oakley and other American officials have urged Boutros-Ghali to appoint an official of international stature as Khatami's successor. According to U.S. sources, Boutros-Ghali is now considering three Americans for the post.

If one is appointed, this will mean that Bir, although in command of the U.N. military forces, will be subordinate to an American who will be in charge of all U.N. operations in Somalia.

Although the U.N. forces will be known as peacekeepers and will wear the traditional blue helmets and berets, the plan anticipates that the Security Council gives them the same authority as the U.S.-led troops to use force to make sure that relief supplies reach those in need without interference from the warlords and their armed bands.

In the past, peacekeepers have usually acted as referees monitoring cease-fire lines between two warring parties. They have usually had no authority to use their weapons except in self-defense. Their weapons, moreover, have almost always been light weapons not capable of mounting any offense. The 500 Pakistani peacekeepers stationed in Mogadishu before the Security Council authorized the U.S.-led military operation were so ineffectual that they became a laughingstock to Somalis.

U.S. officials say they had difficulty persuading Undersecretary General Marrack Goulding, the British diplomat in charge of peacekeeping until recently, to approve a forceful role for the new U.N. peacekeeping operation in Somalia. But Boutros-Ghali shifted Goulding to a new position

Jim Hoagland

WASHINGTON POST

Feb. 23, 1993

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## Lots of Russian Nukes for Sale

Germany's underreported decision this month to participate in two arms deals it would probably have shunned a few years ago is a sign of changing times and forces in the global arms bazaar. More evidence of these changes will come this week when Russia presents a radical proposal to the United States asking Washington to sponsor Russian arms sales abroad.

In the post-Cold War world, the merchants of death—as the private firms and government factories that market weapons for profit are popularly styled—resemble the merchants of coal, VCRs and computers. In this waning of international economic disaster, merchants and manufacturers of all commodities are going global in search of new customers, new funds for research and development, and new sources of technology.

Not even the largest of the world's rapidly shrinking national arsenals can sustain the high costs of modern high-

tech production lines. Without a large Red Army or a growing German military to finance and absorb their output, Russian and German factories must look abroad.

Volkmar Ruhe, Germany's talented and politically ambitious defense minister, conceded as much during a Washington visit last week, when he was asked about his government's agreement to license the export of German-made diesel engines in hundreds of French tanks being sold to Abu Dhabi and electronic components for U.S. missiles being purchased by Taiwan.

"The industrial base in Germany cannot be managed only in regard to German forces now," Ruhe said. "You must be able to cooperate with other countries. If we did not give permission on these deals, it would have set back the German-U.S. relationship and the German-French relationship in arms production and sales for the future."

Globalization is also the driving force

behind new policies being adopted by a giant arms manufacturing enterprise that recently underwent a traumatic restructuring and downsizing: the Russian government.

When Warren Christopher meets Andrei Kozyrev in Geneva on Thursday the U.S. secretary of state will hear a high-priority proposal on cooperation in arms sales from the Russian foreign minister. Kozyrev will ask the United States to carve out a piece of the lucrative Middle East arms market for the Russians and open up Western markets for Russian weapons exports as well.

Recent hints dropped by Russian diplomats to U.S. officials suggest that Kozyrev will argue that this would help Moscow pursue three policies that are in U.S. interests.

Gaining access to U.S.-dominated markets in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere would allow Moscow to continue its costly embargoes against former clients

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## **Glossary**

**Attack Aviation** - Attack helicopters, primarily the AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra, that engage the enemy by direct fire and maneuver.

**Armed Forces Radio** - The organization through which the and Television Service Department of Defense provides news and entertainment to U.S. forces and their families overseas.

**Command Information** - A function of command; CI provides news and information to internal audiences. CI must be the overriding mission of public affairs at all levels.

**Community Relations** - Direct contact between the military and civilian communities. The goal is to gain public understanding for, and acceptance of the military mission.

**Desert Shield** - Period from August 7, 1990, to January 16, 1991.

**Desert Storm** - Period from January 17, 1991, to May 31, 1991.

**DINFOS** - Defense Information School. Training center for military public affairs officers.

**External Public** - Audiences not generally associated with the military. In addition to the general public in the U.S., this category of audience includes local populations overseas and, by extension the enemy and his civilian population.

**Force Multiplier** - An element or principle, such as command information, that increases or enhances soldier effectiveness.

**Gulf War** - Includes both Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

**Internal Public** - Audiences with a direct relationship to the Army and the command. The major groups of internal audiences are soldiers, their family members, Department of the Army civilians and civilian contract employees, military cadets and retirees.

**Maneuver Battalion** - A U.S. Army combat unit that engages the enemy through direct fire and maneuver (attack helicopter, cavalry, infantry or armor).

**One Clear Voice** - The ability for all members of an organization to articulate an agreed upon position regarding an issue or topic.

**Public Affairs** - The military equivalent of public relations. The three functions of Army public affairs are command information, public information, and community relations.

**Public Affairs Officer** - An officer whose primary duty deals with any aspect of public affairs.

**Public Information** - A function of command, PI is the means used by the commander to provide news and information to the various external publics through the media.

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